FFB Bancorp, Fresno, CA (FFBB)

A Ticket to Ride a Gravy Train


Image of Boy Throwing Confetti
Those of you who’ve been following me for awhile may recall that a few years back I was on a tear analyzing America’s one branch banks, both here in the Timyan Bank Alert, and on Seeking Alpha.

Of the "12 Beautiful One Branch-and-Growing Community Banks" I reviewed in a 2018 Seeking Alpha Article, the institution that was Communities First Financial and Fresno First Bank back then — but is FFB Bancorp and FFB Bank now — has me reaching for my wallet.

I don't normally get excited about a bank stock that's trading at 190% of book value, but today, at 7x earnings, this stock — which was CFST then and FFBB now — is a screaming Buy in spite of having appreciated 450% over the past six years.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of FFBB and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

For the most part, institutions that could afford to buy FFBB would find it too dilutive to their own book value to pursue, which is fine by me, as FFB shareholders are likely better off letting the bank's Steve Miller band continue to make their music. I suspect Coastal is the only exception for which FFB would be both a strong strategic play and accretive. 

Coastal Financial, Everett, WA (CCB)

Financial Snapshot
as of 06/30/2024

Total assets:
$1.44B
Tangible book value per share:   
$46.79
NPAs to assets:
0.17%
Price to book:
190%
Market cap:
$282.7M
Dividend yield:
0%
Trailing 12-month ROA:
2.52%
Trailing 12-month ROE:
29.6%

Luminaries

Mark D. Saleh, Chairman
Steven K. Miller, President and CEO
Bhavneet Gill, Executive VP and CFO

Gold Stars

What a difference a new CEO can make!

FFB's current CEO Steve Miller came on board in 2015.

In the ten years before Miller's arrival on the scene — the bank had raised $22.5M and had earned a mere $2M total.

In the eight years since, under Miller's skilled management:
  • The bank has earned $125M without raising a dime of new equity capital.
  • FFB's assets have grown from $275M to $1.4B.
  • FFB has launched a highly profitable payment processing operation that in 2023 alone grew deposits to $228M and pulled in $14M new revenue from fees.
  • Of all publicly traded banks in the United States, FFB has grown its tangible book value per share faster than all but two.

Sources

MainStreet Bancshares, Inc, Fairfax, VA (MNSB)

Wannabe Tech Bro Tricks Investors into Funding a Tech Co


Image of Boy Throwing Confetti
Maybe Jeff Dick is “on” to something with his vision for taking an embedded banking product to market via a subsidiary company he's funded by pilfering $18M of MainStreet's assets over the past three years.
 
From my perspective, it’s neither here nor there. Avenu.bank is a LARP. Dick’s “vision” for it does not right the wrong of risking the bank's assets on ventures that conflict with his promises to investors in the last few capital raises. 
 
For that matter, in Tech Bro lingo, Dick's blown what equates to three rounds of startup funding without bringing a Minimum Viable Product successfully to market. So even if we were willing investors in “his" tech co, we’d have to declare: Game Over! 

That's why I’ll be submitting a shareholder proposal for the 2025 Annual Meeting recommending that MainStreet's Board sell MainStreet Bancshares and Avenu.bank.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of MNSB and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

Atlantic Union Bankshares, Glen Allen, VA (AUB)
Burke & Herbert Financial Services, Alexandria, VA (BHRB)
United Bancshares, Inc, Charleston, WV (UBSI)

Financial Snapshot
as of 06/30/2024

Total assets:
$2.09B
Tangible book value per share:   
$23.72
NPAs to assets:
1%
Price to book:
63%
Market cap:
$128M
Dividend yield:
2.4%
Trailing 12-month ROA:
0.86%
Trailing 12-month ROE:
8%

Scoundrels

Jeff W. Dick, Chairman and CEO
Terry M. Saeger, Vice Chairman
Patsy I. Rust, Founding Director

Please note, as of this posting, we have no reason to believe the Avenu software, or even the idea behind it are flawed in any way. 
 
Avenu staff appear to be competent and well-meaning professionals. Sadly, they’re employed by a reckless Bank CEO and Board instead of a true tech company where they could be awarded stock options and the opportunity to benefit from an IPO someday.

Red Flags

Promises, Promises 
  • In 2017, as inducement to raise $18M at $16/share, Dick told prospective investors he would use the funding to grow and sell the bank in three years. 
  • In 2018, as inducement to raise $45M more at $19/share, Dick reiterated this promise to prior and new investors. Investors in this round are losing money today. 
  • Even if the three-year clock restarted upon the 2018 promise, Dick was beholden to sell the bank in 2021. 
 Opportunity Cost and Lost 
  • In Q1 2021, MNSB was trading at $21/share and could have garnered over $30/share in a sale, based on industry M&A pricing at time. 
  • Instead of selling as promised, which would have delivered investors an ROI of over 50%, Dick began funneling the bank's assets into a high risk tech venture. 
  • Six years after Dick reiterated his promise to sell in three, MNSB is trading at just over $16/share —13% below the 2018 offering price. 
  • To add insult to injury, Dick raised his $666K salary to $1,583,000 total compensation in 2023. 
Comedy of Errors 
  • Note, Dick is a decent banker. He successfully raised capital from bank investors and grew a startup bank into a valuable franchise. 
  • Dick is not a software engineer. He’s never run a tech company. He never raised venture capital from willing and witting investors looking to build their stock in tech ventures. 
  • Dick has spent three years and $18M to build a sandbox and allegedly contract seven prospects to "start" integration. 
  • Dick’s sandbox is a non-performing asset.* Based on like ventures in the fintech space, it’s fair to assume it will require at least as much new money to make up for lost ground and turn a true profit. 
  • As Chairman of the Board, Dick pursued this costly, risky endeavor without ensuring the Board had the competencies needed to manage all the new categories of risk the venture entails. 
  • We understand, Dick is having the time of his life. See Dick smile. He’s soooo much smarter than Synapse’s Sankaet Pathak and Unit’s Itai Damti.  
Opportunity Ahead? 
  • Is Avenu.bank a promising venture? Who knows? Dick hasn’t felt the need to provide MainStree's investors a proper opportunity to vet the idea. The first we heard of it was Q4 2021 via one paragraph buried at the end of an earnings release. 
Investors were shown no pitch deck explaining Avenu's business model, how the NewCo fits into the competitive marketplace precisely, what its projected funding needs and operating cost structure are, how the revenue engine really works, or when Avenu is shooting to break even in its own right. 
  • Is Avenu en route to being America's Revolut, except via a reverse path and homegrown? A hybrid between Revolut and Chime, but for an exclusively B2B market? Something between Revolut and Unit, but with a pared down set of services and functionality? A seasoned tech investor can make some inferences, but Dick isn’t saying. 
  • Who are Avenu’s Seven Mysterious Prospects? Dick hasn’t bothered to provide even the most generic descriptions of the customers he’s allegedly already contracted. How big are these organizations, where are they located, how much revenue is he anticipating from each one, over what period of time, and by what logic is he estimating it? 
  • For that matter, what happened to the 26 customers Avenu supposedly had back in 2022 when Dick reported the venture had brought $67M of deposits to the bank? What happened to the deposits? 
We Have Questions!

However, it’s too late to ask them, and we know everything we need to know:
 
Dick is not the kind of Tech Bro CEO you give more money and runway, and MainStreet’s Board has proven incapable of managing the risks of his technology plays.

Sources

UPDATE: First Commerce Bancorp, Lakewood, NJ (CMRB)

A Case of Being Run Off the Road


Image of Young White Boy in Red Shirt with Skinned Knee beside Red Bike on the Ground
It's been five years since I reviewed First Commerce Bank, and I'm sorry to say it wasn't the good buy I thought it was. The Board's high ownership stake failed to incentivize doing the right thing the way it normally does. (See April 2019 Timyan Bank Alert post "A Case of Growing Too Fast.")

The photo I selected for the CMRB review series strikes me very differently today. This kid didn't fall off his bike. He was shoved.

Experts say the best way to deal with characters as self-serving and shameless as the folks running First Commerce is to Run The Other Way. Do Not Engage. Do Not Look Back. Someday I will learn.

CMRB is a Sell.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I no longer own shares of CMRB and definitely have no plans to purchase any ever again.


Prospective Buyers

This list has getting shorter and more paltry, because First Commerce squandered its best opportunities for a sale. The three remaining prospects listed here are overcapitalized underperformers that likely can't pay a premium:

Blue Foundry Bancorp, Rutherford, NJ (BLFY)
Columbia Financial, Fair Lawn, NJ (CLBK)
SR Bancorp, Bound Brook, NJ (SRBK)

Financial Snapshot
as of 03/31/2024

Total assets:
$1.5B
Tangible book value per share:   
$8.13
NPAs to assets:
1.3%
Price to book:
74%
Market cap:
$135M
Dividend yield:
2.7%
Trailing 12-month ROA:
0.8%
Trailing 12-month ROE:
6.3%

Scoundrels

Thomas P. Bovino, Chairman
Abraham M. Penzer, Vice Chairman
Donald Mindiak, President and CEO

The Skinny

Why I'm calling CMRB a Sell
  • The prospects for acquisition at a meaningful premium are bleak
  • Although First Commerce could still fetch an offer near today's book value of $8, I don't believe there's anything that would actually compel Management to take the franchise to market
  • No shareholder proposal has a prayer in this case, because Board ownership is still too high for it to garner enough votes
  • The stock is going nowhere due to mismanagement
Since my 2019 review of First Commerce 
  • The Board has waged two coups
    • First they ousted Chairman Abe Opatut, the bank's largest shareholder 
    • Then they voted successor Chairman Benedict Romeo and three other Directors off the board
  • Bank operations are suffering
    • Deposit costs are rising faster than loan yields
    • Reliance on office and other commercial real estate is too high
  • Nepotism is a likely factor
    • One of Director Gershon Beigeleisen's first moves upon joining the Board was to install his son on a speed-track from Teller to First Commerce Loan Officer
    • Per the rumor mill, there are more install-my-kid initiatives in the works
  • There's more self-dealing in the mix here than normal
    • Director Salvatore Alfieri bills the bank $200K per year for legal work through his firm
    • Vice Chairman Abe Penzer's only income is from title work he does on First Commerce Bank's loans, which has funneled $350K to $600K a year his way
    • New Chairman Thomas Bovino is allegedly campaigning hard to triple his own compensation

Sources