Showing posts with label activist investing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label activist investing. Show all posts

UPDATE: Peoples Financial Corp, Biloxi, MS (PFBX)

I no longer have reservations about calling management of The Peoples Bank "scoundrels." 

When I reviewed Peoples Financial Corp back in 2015, Chairman and CEO Chevis Swetman had some handy excuses — Hurricane Katrina, the BP oil spill. But what's the excuse for being a bloated, non-performing bank to this day?

Clearly, Swetman's not going to do the work it takes to turn The Peoples Bank around. The only folks sweating in this scenario are shareholders. And the only way out of this hot mess is for Swetman to do the right thing and sell this bank.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of PFBX and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

Peoples Financial Corp has the same prospects for selling The Peoples Bank that it had when I reviewed it three years ago.

Bancorp South, Tupelo, MS (BXS)
First Bancshares, Hattisburg, MS (FBMS)
Iberiabank, Lafayette, LA (IBKC)

Financial Snapshot
as of 12/31/2018

Total assets:
$617M
Tangible book value per share:   
$17.59
NPAs to assets:
3.0%
Price to book:
66%
Market cap:
$57.6M
Dividend yield:
0.17%
Trailing 12-month ROA:
0.1%
Trailing 12-month ROE:
0.7%

Scoundrels

Chevis B Swetman, Chairman, President, and CEO
A Wes Fulmer, Executive VP and Chief Credit Officer
Laurie A Wood, Senior VP and CFO

Red Flags

Want me to explain how bad this bank is? No sweat!
  • Swetman's 92% efficiency ratio is in the bottom 5% of all US banks
  • His 3% NPAs to assets ratio is in the bottom 5%, too
  • Loans at The Peoples Bank are down 24% in the last five years
  • Book value per share has declined by $1 in spite of stock buybacks at 70%
  • PFBX shareholders have seen the value of their holdings drop by $110M since 2000
Meanwhile...
  • Among the people who suffered this 70% decline in the value of their holdings since 2000 are the clients of Peoples' Trust Department, who collectively own 5% of PFBX
Enough already. In three years, Swetman has barely budged. He's now 69. The bank's not working and neither is he. Every stakeholder in PFBX and the bank's geographic area will be better served by new operators who will put some muscle into The Peoples Bank.

Sources

UPDATE: Brunswick Bancorp, Brunswick, NJ (BRBW)

Four hundred and fifty five days after my April 2017 Review of Brunswick Bancorp, head scoundrel Roman Gumina met his Maker.

In death there is hope! If Roman's successor Uncle Frank Junior can right side the bank's expenses, it's entirely plausible we could see a resurrection of BRBW share price to $14. Were Uncle Frankie to sell the bank, Brunswick stock could conceivably garner the same.

Question is, how much of Roman Gumina's greed is embodied in the bank's operational design and family management DNA? In his wake, is BRBW a bargain buy or a pile of dead money?


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of BRBW and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

Still true today: The $95M of deposits in Brunswick's Livingston Ave branch headquarters might be appealing to area institutions, but I doubt any buyer would be interested in the 4 out of 7 other branches struggling to manage less than $9M each.

Amboy Bancorp, Old Bridge, NJ (private)
Magyar Bancorp, New Brunswick, NJ (MGYR)
Provident Financial Services, Iselin, NJ (PFS)

Financial Snapshot
as of 06/30/2018

Total assets:
$187M
Tangible book value per share:     
$12.50
NPAs to assets:
4.6%
Price to book:
70%
Market cap:
$26.5M
Dividend yield:
0%
Trailing 12-month ROA:
0.3%
Trailing 12-month ROE:
1.7%

Scoundrels

Frank Gumina, Jr, Interim Chairman
Nicholas A. Frungillo, Jr, President and CEO
Frank J. Gumina III, Esq, Vice President, Bank Counsel

Red Flag

My concerns about Brunswick Bank & Trust are essentially unchanged since my April 2017 review.
  1. The bank's expenses are way out of line with industry norms or anything justifiable (see table below).
  2. Roman Gumina owned at least 10 unrelated entities, and money is still flowing from the bank to some of them.
  3. More than half the bank's branches are too small to be profitable, and should be closed.
  4. NPA's are 4x current industry average.
Here's what I'd love to see Management do (and, what fiscal responsibility requires):
  • Cut Occupancy and Other Expenses in half! That alone should add $450K to pre-tax earnings and produce triple last quarter’s earnings.
  • Cut the asking price of REO low enough to sell it, then put the proceeds into earning assets. That could add another $160K to the pre-tax income.
  • Don't spend the late Gumina’s $310,000/year salary on anyone or anything new. That's cash straight to the bottom line.
  • Do these three things, and watch earnings rise six-fold!
How Brunswick Bank's expenses compare to peers'.

Brunswick Bank & Trust Expenses are more than double what they should be!


not including rent charged for Bank use of Gumina properties
a Timyan Bank Alert favorite in NJ
in the two quarters prior to close of merger with SB One Bancorp (SBBX)

Sources

  • Confidential interviews with shareholders and analysts

UPDATE: Northeast Community Bancorp, White Plains, NY (NECB)

It's time Management at Northeast Community Bancorp stop hoarding the company's shares.

Since my August 2012 review, NECB has managed to accrue some value and bank operations have improved upon Jose Collazo's ascendance in leadership.

Still, Management has failed to feed the bank's shareholders a square meal now for over 11 years, even though they could easily double NECB's value just by converting the rest of the stock to full public ownership.

As I explain below, even if they don't, NECB is too cheap to ignore.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of NECB and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

Dime Community Bancshares, Brooklyn, NY (DCOM)
PCSB Financial Corp, Yorktown Heights, NY (PCSB)
Webster Financial Corp, Waterbury, CT (WBS)

Financial Snapshot
as of 09/30/2017

(estimates based on Call Report)

Total assets:
$759M
Tangible book value per share:   
$9.25
NPAs to assets:
0.67%
Price to book:
108%
Market cap:
$122M
Dividend yield:
1.2%
Trailing 12-month ROA:
0.9%
Trailing 12-month ROE:
5.8%

Mostly Scoundrels
One Luminary

Kenneth Martinek, Chairman and CEO
Kenneth H. Thomas, Director
Diane B. Cavanaugh, Director

Jose Collazo, President and COO

The Skinny

Given where recent conversions trade in the market, the NECB value proposition is better than ever.

Were NECB to fully convert at book value, minority shareholders would obtain $18.83 per share. NECB is trading at about half that value today,  right where it converted in 2006.

Even if the bank opts not to fully convert, Northeast Community shareholders can be glad to have stayed at the table. The dinner may be late, but it won't be too shabby compared to what's available in the neighborhood.

For example, consider another similarly-sized New York Mutual Holding Company that recently effected a partial conversion like NECB's — PDL Community Bancorp (PDLB).

PDLB has a $275M market cap and assets about the same as NECB's at $813M, but were PDL to sell the rest of its shares at book value, its minority shareholders would obtain only $16.20 a share. PDLB is trading at 92% of that value today.

Meanwhile, NECB is trading at half PDLB's market cap, while earning twice the money as PDLB.

Sources

  • Confidential interviews with shareholders and analysts

Brunswick Bancorp, New Brunswick, NJ (BRBW)

A Case of Appeal to Family Interest


There's no indication that the scoundrels at Brunswick Bancorp care about their shareholders, but maybe we can appeal to their greed.

Given that Chairman and CEO Roman Gumina owns 27%, his mother 5.5%, and other Guminas 4.2% or more, the family has two great options for making out good without further shareholder shake down:
  1. Were the Guminas to sell the bank outright, they would increase the value of their own holdings by $10M. Outside investors would score a similar amount.
  2. Alternatively, the Gumina family could use a quarter of the bank's excess capital to buy stock back from those of us who want out, make Brunswick Bank & Trust even more of a family operation, and still increase the value of their holdings by $10M.
In any event, if you don't own BRBW, consider yourself lucky! Even at 58% of book value, the stock only "looks" cheap.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of BRBW and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

The $88M in deposits in Brunswick's Livingston Ave branch might be appealing to area institutions, but I doubt any buyer would be interested in the 5 out of 6 other branches struggling to manage less than $10M each.

Amboy Bancorp, Old Bridge, NJ (private)
Magyar Bancorp, New Brunswick, NJ (MGYR)
Provident Financial Services, Iselin, NJ (PFS)

Financial Snapshot
as of 12/31/2016
Total assets:
$180M
Tangible book value per share:
$12.14
NPAs to assets:
6.5%
Price to book:
59%
Market cap:
$21.7M
Dividend yield:
0%
Trailing 12-month return on assets:
0.38%
Trailing 12-month return on equity:
1.85%

Scoundrels

Roman Gumina, Chairman and CEO
Nicholas A. Frungillo, Jr., President
Louis Foulke, CFO, Secretary and Treasurer

Red Flags

Ask around and you'll hear all sorts of unsettling rumors about the Gumina family — real gangster stuff, complete with death threats and people suddenly going "dark" after daring to voice their concerns. In the interest of self-preservation, I'll step around all that here.

Performance at Brunswick Bank & Trust hasn't improved in decades. In 1989, under the-now-deceased Carmen Gumina's watch, the bank earned $1.1M. It hasn't come close since. NPAs were 10% as recently as Year End 2012, and are still high at 6.5%.

Meanwhile, current Chairman and CEO Roman Gumina has been "rewarding" himself pretty handsomely:
  • Over the past seven years, Brunswick Bancorp has suffered a cumulative loss of $501K while Roman skimmed off $2,266,000.
  • In 2010, the bank lost $1.2M and NPAs reached 12%, but that didn't stop Roman from taking a $96K bonus on top of his $310K base pay.
  • Even as the bank started reporting income — net of $283K, $406K, and $677K in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively — Roman's $310K a year salary is beyond what you'd call "commensurate with performance." 
  • In spite of his high compensation and the bank's screaming need for stronger management, Gumina doesn't appear to consider his responsibilities or pay grade worthy of full-time attention.

10 Other Entities in which Roman Gumina Owns a Controlling Interest 
  1. Aaron Road Associates
  2. Cardal Associates
  3. Cranbury Station LLC
  4. Applegarth Associates
  5. Carmine Investments
  6. Brunswick Management LLC
  7. Englishtown Realty LLC
  8. Mullica Hill Management
  9. Mantec Associates
  10. Franklinville Plaza Management Associates LLC

Sources

  • Confidential interviews with shareholders and analysts

UPDATE: HopFed Bancorp, Hopkinsville, KY (HFBC)


Since my June 2012 Timyan Bank Alert™ review of HopFed Bancorp / Heritage Bank, book value has fallen to $12.87 per share, a 25% reduction since the economic recovery began in 2009 and most of the nation's banks have materially increased their value. NPAs still linger above 2%. HFBC's ROA and ROE are shamefully low.

Disappointingly, there is no longer any reason to invest in HopFed unless Management sells the bank. It is too mismanaged. If you already own the stock like I do, I highly recommend letting HopFed management know you agree that the ethical thing to do is to sell the bank.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own significant shares of HFBC and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.



Prospective Buyers

Independence Bank, Owensboro, KY (private)
Old National Bancorp, Evansville, IN (ONB)
WesBanco, Inc, Wheeling, WV (WSBC)

Financial Snapshot
as of 12/31/2016
Total assets:
$891M
Tangible book value per share:
$12.87
NPAs to assets:
2%
Price to book:
116%
Market cap:
$100M
Dividend yield:
1.1%
Trailing 12-month return on assets:
0.33%
Trailing 12-month return on equity:
3.26%
TARP:$0M*
*Redeemed $18.4M 12/19/2012

Scoundrels

Harry Joseph Dempsey, Chairman (New!)
John Peck, President and CEO
Billy Duval, Senior VP, Treasurer, and CFO
Michael L. Woolfolk, Executive VP, Secretary, and COO 

Red Flags

(See HFBC Performance Timeline, below)

Sources

  • Confidential interviews with shareholders and analysts


HFBC Performance Timeline since 2012 review in Timyan Bank Alert™

DATE
EVENT
SHARE PRICE
2014
AUG 20
HFBC CFO Billy Duvall sells 1147 shares for $13,704
$12.37
2015
FEB 03
HFBC pays greenmail to investor Maltese Capital. Buys back 534,943 shares at $13.50
$13.25

FEB 09
HFBC Chief Credit Officer Michael Fokey buys 31 shares of HFBC stock for $412.00
$13.30

JUL 31
HFBC reports a Q2 loss of 2 cents per share
$11.66

AUG 17
HFBC COO Michael Woolfolk buys 79 shares for $908.50
$11.59
2016
MAR 29
HFBC revises compensation plans and decides to pay its executives’ personal income taxes
$11.45

JUN 01
HFBC CFO Billy Duvall sells 1500 shares for $18,165
$12.08

JUL 29
HFBC reports a 130% increase in non-accrual loans
$11.62

FALL
HFBC attempts to pay greenmail to investor Stilwell Group, which would hurt all other shareholders
$11s
2017
JAN 26
HFBC issues misleading 8K, which failed to disclose the real reason its largest investor didn't meet with HFBC management. In reality, Stilwell did not refuse to meet, but merely asked for an agenda in advance, anticipating another greenmail offer to go away
$14.00

FEB 06
Stilwell Group’s Megan Parisi sets the record straight about HFBC's false and misleading 8K in a letter to HFBC CEO John Peck
$14.60


Greer Bancshares, Inc, Greer, SC (GRBS)

The Case of a Greedy Grip on Greer


Grrrrrr! The guys at Greer Bancshares have me growling.

Even if they stopped their money grubbing today and all else goes well, I have trouble seeing how the market price of GRBS could reach much over $15 — not a terrible return, but also not optimal, especially considering the risks involved. In a sale, GRBS shares could garner $17, more than 40% above today's stock price.

I agree with C Don Wall, a former Director and Greer's largest shareholder: the Board has a fiduciary responsibility to loosen its grip on the bank and let shareholders sell it if they wish.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of GRBS and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.


Prospective Buyers

BNC Bancorp, High Point, NC (BNCN)
First Citizens BancShares, Inc, Raleigh, NC (FCNCA)
United Community Banks, Inc, Blairsville, GA (UCBI)

Financial Snapshot
as of 6/30/2016
Total assets:$378M
Tangible book value per share:$10.89
NPAs to assets:1.7%
Price to book:105%
Market cap:$28M
Dividend yield:1.7%
Trailing 12-month return on assets:0.74%
Trailing 12-month return on equity:11.3%
TARP:$0M*
*Redeemed $10M 7/23/2014

Scoundrels

Gary M. Griffin, Chairman
J Richard Medlock Jr, Secretary, President, and CEO

Red Flags

The Greed. These greedy guys (and gals)...
  • paid shareholders a paltry $248,669 in dividends over the past eight years (2007-2015) while they stuffed 8x that into their own pockets, reporting $2,007,693 in Board fees
  • have been paying themselves 10% interest for deferred Directors compensation (right up until last year), 20x the 0.5% rate they pay customers for 1-year CDs 
  • recently cut their deferred compensation interest rate by half, but it's still 10x the rate they pay their customers 
[No wonder that a full third of Greer's directors don't even own an amount of stock equal to a year's worth of board fees!]

The Grip. These same greedy guys are...
  • misusing an outdated requirement that 70% of the Board agree to a change of control, when the norm is 50%*
  • refusing to hand over corporate records shareholders have requested to inspect, in open defiance of their obligations under South Carolina law
  • persisting on a self-serving path of independence at the expense of the bank's core shareholder base
*Until this is changed, that aforementioned third of the Board that owns next to no GRBS stock can effectively block the interests of shareholders who own 99% of it.

Other Gripes. While their hands are busy grabbing profits and maintaining their grip on the bank, these guys are dropping the ball:
  • From 2011 to 2015 both loans and deposits declined. (Deposits have meagerly improved over the past few months.)
  • Instead of taking in deposits and lending them out, Greer is borrowing money from the FHLB and taking on debt to invest in the bond market — a risky wager given that interest rates are at record lows. (A 2% interest rate increase could wipe out more than half of the bank's equity.)
  • The bank's efficiency ratio increased from 69.9% in 2011 to 72.5% in 2015, in a game where the target is a healthy 60% or less.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
My Gratitude to fellow shareholders C Don Wall, Dennis Hennett, and Paula Lawrence — who launched a proxy fight last year — for their shareholder advocacy and stand for right behavior.

Sources

  • Confidential interviews with shareholders and analysts

Peoples Financial Corp, Biloxi, MS (PFBX)

A Case of Sweating Bullets in Biloxi


As a humanitarian, I can't bring myself to label Chevis Swetman a "scoundrel," in spite of the pressure cooker conditions he has created for his Trust Department clients and other PFBX shareholders. Swetman is reported to have worked up an honest sweat helping people after Hurricane Katrina. And judging from the unusually high number of people he keeps on the bank's payroll, he appears to be motivated by a big heart. But as a Fiduciary, I have to ask Swetman to sell the bank.


Disclosure: As of this posting, I own shares of PFBX and may subsequently either dispose of them or purchase more.

Prospective Buyers
To win in Mississippi's Harrison and Hancock Counties, you gotta be able to sweat it out against Hancock Bank (HBHC). Peoples' branches could help any of these players stand a chance.
Bancorp South, Tupelo, MS (BXS)
First Bancshares, Hattiesburg, MS (FBMS)
Iberiabank, Lafayette, LA (IBKC)
Financial Snapshot
as of 06/30/2015

Total assets:
$680M
Tangible book value per share:
$17.99
NPAs to assets:
6.25%
Price to book:
54.1%
Market cap:
$50M
Dividend yield:
0%
Trailing 12-month return on assets:
- 1.9%
Trailing 12-month return on equity:
- 14%
The Crew
Chevis B Swetman, Chairman, President, and CEO
A Wes Fulmer, Executive VP and Chief Credit Officer
Laurie A Wood, Senior VP and CFO
The Skinny

If I'm right to infer that people are Swetman's calling, then maybe it would help to broaden his understanding of how real people are being negatively impacted by Peoples' Financial.

I'm most bothered what clients of the bank's Trust Department have experienced.
  • These people collectively own 5% of PFBX
  • In most Trust Departments, some clients are elderly, some are widowed, some are sick, and some have dependents whose futures are entirely reliant upon the entrusted investments
  • Surely, Swetman personally knows at least some of these people
Let's quantify the harm that has me sweating bullets on behalf of these folks and others:
  • Peoples' Trust Department clients have experienced PFBX stock decline by 70% since 2000
  • PFBX shareholders collectively have seen the value of their holdings drop by $110M in the same period
I really want to believe Swetman is a decent man, and I can forgive him if he changes course now to make amends. Question is, will he break into the sweat needed to do what it will take?
  • Drastically reduce redundancies in staff and other expenses
  • Close underperforming branches
  • Cut his own $354K annual compensation
  • Knock out NPAs, stubbornly holding at a high water mark of 6%
  • And, sell the bank to a more skilled operator
In short, Chevis Swetman could still leave a positive legacy here. The work to do is clear, the bank has good prospects for a sale, and at 66, he's still young enough to make a difference pursuing another calling. Let's hope he cares enough about people to do right by Peoples.
Sources